Episode 48: Not Making Judgements About Philosophy Based On "Vibes"

I’ve had a few queries and comments, mostly in YouTube but also in some other places lately, that got me thinking about a sort of general topic. And this is one of those, if the shoe fits, wear it. Many of you listening to this, probably this isn’t the case for you, but you might know somebody that this would be helpful for to hear, or maybe just share this idea with them.

And I’m going to put it in a really flippant sort of contemporary culture way. You don’t want to make judgments about philosophy or philosophers based on what the kids these days call “vibes”. And actually, it’s not just the kids these days. There’s lots of other people who use the term ironically, and it’s been around for a very long time. I mean, longer than my generation, the generation before mine, the boomers were talking about good vibes.

And so, you know, it’s made its way back into the popular parlance and taken up a seat in popular conversations about philosophy and many, many other fields as well for, I would say, close to a decade now.

And what do I mean by this? So we could get a little bit more expansive and perhaps even rigorous about this notion. People have been doing this for a very, very long time, going way back in the literature that we have, you’ve got to do some work in order to find it, I imagine. But I’ve encountered this in literature, about literature, about philosophy, about other fields as well.

And it consists in making a judgment not based on actually spending time reading the thinker and working through their thought in a kind of careful and receptive manner and then coming to a well-founded conclusion about them but instead taking shortcuts, going by your gut, or reading for the gist, and only catching maybe 10% of what’s being said, or even just going by what you’ve heard about them from other people, and using that as sort of your input as you then start reading your way through people.

I’m going to give you a prime example of this that happened recently, and it was in Substack, and it was specifically about Alasdair MacIntyre, because I’m advertising that I’m teaching this upcoming class on MacIntyre’s After Virtue, which is a complex book. It’s covering a lot of the history of ideas coming all the way up to present culture, and you know there’s a good bit of sophistication to it. This person asked about something that showed me that they they didn’t really know that much about MacIntyre, and whatever ideas they had were kind of garbled and

They asked about universal moral frameworks. Does MacIntyre ever deliver on his promise to provide that? And that’s exactly the opposite of what MacIntyre does. He mentions universal moral frameworks as something that the Enlightenment was attempting to provide us with and then failing to do so over and over and over again with a number of different attempts, a number of different responses and steps. And he’s quite right about that.

And so this person, you know, maybe they were reading and not reading attentively, so they fell into the mistake of thinking that the philosopher who is criticizing a position is actually endorsing that position. So I wrote them back and I was like: yeah, MacIntyre doesn’t do that. If you think that he is, why don’t you cite me (and I’m being flippant here), cite me some chapter and verse, meaning tell me where in the text you’re actually finding this.

And their response was to say: Well you know, I just read a few chapters of it and that was the impression that I got from it. And I wrote back and said, well, see, there’s your mistake. You don’t ever want to make judgments about a philosophical work or about a philosopher or about a school based just on small sample size and your first impressions of that, because they’re probably going to be wrong.

And I’m going to say right up front (well not exactly up front, because I’ve been talking now for several minutes about that!), but I’m going to lay it out for you: I’ve done that myself plenty of times. And I t